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CPLR 302(a)(1): Retaining a New York attorney not a "transaction of business" within the state.
Under CPLR 302(a) (1), a non-domiciliary is subject to the
jurisdiction of the New York courts if he "transacts any business"
in this state. In a case where a non-domiciliary defendant hires
the plaintiff to work for him in New York, the question arises as
to whether the acts of the plaintiff may serve as a basis for jurisdiction over the defendant.
In Winick v. Jacksons it was held that the retaining of a
New York attorney by a non-domiciliary to represent him in New
York did not constitute a transaction of business in this state by
the non-domiciliary. The court reasoned that an attorney is similar
to an independent contractor and, therefore, his acts cannot be
considered to be those of the defendant. The court was careful
to distinguish the instant case from the type of case where the
plaintiff is an employee of the defendant. In such cases, under the
law of principal-agent, the employee's acts are clearly the acts of
the employer. 69 This latter type of case is illustrated by Schneider
v. J. & C. Carpet Co.,70 which involved an action for breach of
contract brought by a sales representative and employee of the nondomiciliary defendant. In that case, the court stated that "the
activities of the plaintiff in New York in furtherance of the contract must be considered as being those of the defendant." 71
In distinguishing Schneider from the instant case, the court
cited as support A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA.,7 2 wherein the
plaintiff's acts were not attributed to the defendant since the plaintiff was an independent broker. In Millner, however, jurisdiction
was sustained on other grounds (officers of the defendant had
transacted business in New York).
There is one case which the court in Winick failed to note
and which casts some doubt on the validity of its decision. Lewis
V. American Archives Ass'n 73 involved an action for breach of
contract brought by an attorney hired by an out-of-state domiciliary.
The attorney had been hired to conduct examinations before trial
in New York. The contract was consummated in New York, and
the defendant's vice president came to New York to attend the
examinations. On the basis of these facts, the court sustained
jurisdiction.
1966).
69 See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
417 (1965).
7023 App. Div. 2d 103, 258 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1965).
71 Schneider v. J. & C. Carpet Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 105, 258 N.Y.S.2d
6849 Misc. 2d 1009, 268 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County

717, 719 (1st Dep't 1965).
7224

App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966).

73 43 Misc. 2d 721, 252 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. Washington County
1964).
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It may be possible to distinguish Lewis from Winick on the
ground that Lewis contained additional jurisdictional facts. Because of this difference it will be necessary to await future decisions before predicting with accuracy when New York courts will
exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant on the basis
of acts performed by the plaintiff in New York on the defendant's
behalf. It is evident, however, that if the plaintiff is an employee
of the defendant, jurisdiction will be sustained. The area of uncertainty lies where the plaintiff is classified as an independent
contractor.
CPLR 308: Parties mtay not provide for their own inethods of
service.
In National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Dec-Wood Corp.,7 4 the
parties entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff corporation,
doing business in New York, leased certain machinery to the nondomiciliary defendants. The contract stipulated that all actions
arising out of the agreement were to be litigated in New York,
and further provided that any action may be commenced by sending the process by certified mail to the defendants at their out-ofstate address. This suit, to recover rent allegedly unpaid, was
commenced by service in this manner.
The defendants objected to New York's exercise of jurisdiction on the grounds that (1) New York had no basis for jurisdiction since the defendants never transacted business in New York,
and (2) the method of service employed was defective since this
method was not authorized by the CPLR.
The court rejected the defendants' first contention that New
York had no basis for jurisdiction. In so doing, the court was in
accord with prior case law which has established that parties may
designate the forum in which the actions arising out of their contracts are to be adjudicated.75 The court, however, sustained the
contention that the method of service was invalid because it lacked
statutory authorization. The court based this holding upon the
New York State Constitution and those segments of the CPLR
which indicate that the legislature alone may specify methods of
service. The state constitution provides that the legislature shall
have the power to regulate "jurisdiction and proceedings in law
and in equity .. . " " and CPLR 306 states that "proof of service
shall specify . . . that the service was made . . . in an authorized

manner." These factors, together with the additional fact that the
CPLR 77 expressly provides for the manner in which service may
74 49 Misc. 2d 538, 267 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
7 5 Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
71 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 30.
77CPLR 303, 311, 318.

